Emory Law Journal
Volume 68

Issue 6

2019

Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer: Playing "in the Joints" and on
the Playground
Gabrielle Gollomp

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj

Recommended Citation
Gabrielle Gollomp, Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer: Playing "in the Joints" and on the Playground, 68
Emory L. J. 1147 (2019).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol68/iss6/4

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory Law Journal by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

GOLLOMP_5.21.2019_PUBLICATION COPY

5/21/2019 3:02 PM

TRINITY LUTHERAN CHURCH V. COMER: PLAYING “IN THE
JOINTS” AND ON THE PLAYGROUND
ABSTRACT
In Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, the Supreme Court
determined that a state could not deny a church generally available benefits
because of its religious character. In doing so, the Trinity Lutheran decision
disregarded Missouri’s long-standing constitutional provision that denies state
funds to religiously affiliated organizations and ignored Supreme Court
precedent such as Locke v. Davey, which determined that states have discretion
over the extent to which they want to use state tax dollars to support religion.
Before Trinity Lutheran, the Supreme Court consistently recognized that there
is a “play in the joints” between the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise
Clause, meaning that some state government actions are neither prohibited by
the Establishment Clause nor required by the Free Exercise Clause. Issues
concerning tax exemptions and state funding are consistently held to fall within
the “play in the joints.” This “play in the joints” permits state and local
governments to refuse to fund religious institutions, even if funding them would
be constitutionally permissible.
The Trinity Lutheran decision significantly limits the freedom of state and
local governments to have and enforce state constitutional provisions
prohibiting the use of public funds to aid religion. This Comment argues that the
Trinity Lutheran decision is problematic because it undercuts the federalism at
work in Locke v. Davey. Locke v. Davey is the proper interpretation of the
relationship between First Amendment religion clauses and state tax dollars
because it recognizes the importance of state antiestablishment interests and
federalism and leaves religious funding issues for the states to resolve. Thus, the
Trinity Lutheran Court should have followed the decision in Locke, leaving state
tax issues sub-constitutional.
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INTRODUCTION
In Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, a church that operates a
preschool applied for a state grant that provides funds for resurfacing
playgrounds with rubberized material.1 Missouri denied Trinity Lutheran
Church’s application because Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution
states, “no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or
indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion.”2 Missouri
refused to provide a grant to the church based on its state constitutional policy
of denying grants to religiously affiliated organizations—a policy that is rooted
in the fundamental principle that the government must not “establish” an official
religion, but rather maintain the separation of church and state.3 In refusing the
grant, the state was upholding a long-standing state policy of enforcing the
state’s antiestablishment interests. As the Eighth Circuit observed, Missouri “has
a long history of maintaining a very high wall between church and state.”4
However, contrary to Missouri’s antiestablishment concerns, the Supreme
Court in Trinity Lutheran determined that the state could not deny generally
available benefits to the church because of its religious character.5 While the
decision initially appears limited in scope due to its narrow holding about a
rubberized playground surface and a cryptic footnote,6 the consequences for
federalism are concerning. Trinity Lutheran significantly curtails the freedom of
state governments to have and enforce their state constitutional provisions
forbidding the use of public funds to aid religious institutions.
Federalism has been an essential part of American government since the time
of the Framers.7 Federalism principles endeavor to ensure that the federal
government holds specific enumerated powers and the states retain broad
discretion over the remaining matters.8 Federalism is essential because it allows
states to act as laboratories to formulate the most effective solutions to important

1

Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2017 (2017).
Id. (quoting MO. CONST. art. I, § 7).
3
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.; MO. CONST. art. I, § 7.
4
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 788 F.3d 779, 783 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 364 F. Supp. 376, 383–84 (W.D. Mo. 1973), aff’d, 419 U.S. 888 (1974)).
5
Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2025.
6
Id. at 2024 n.3 (“This case involves express discrimination based on religious identity with respect to
playground resurfacing. We do not address religious uses of funding or other forms of discrimination.”).
7
See Stuart D. Poppel, Federalism, Fundamental Fairness, and the Religion Clauses, 25 CUMB. L. REV.
247, 250 (1995) (citing Note, Rethinking the Incorporation of the Establishment Clause: A Federalist View, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1700, 1705 (1992)).
8
Id. at 250–51.
2
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problems the entire country faces.9 Furthermore, federalism allows individuals
to choose to live in a state that closely aligns with their ideals and addresses
these problems in a way they find desirable.10 Thus, if the federal government
refuses to defer to state autonomy on important issues, it eliminates the variety
of state solutions to local problems and diminishes individual freedom.11
In recent decades, state constitutional law has reemerged as a source of
individual rights independent of the federal Constitution.12 As Justice Brennan
noted, “more and more state courts are construing state constitutional
counterparts of provisions of the Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens of their
states even more protection than the federal provisions, even those identically
phrased.”13 Many state court decisions stand for the proposition that state
constitutions can provide greater protection for individual rights and that the
state constitutional provisions should be interpreted independently, instead of in
relation to their federal counterparts.14 The independence of state constitutions
has been particularly true with regard to state constitutional protections of
religious freedom.15
Specifically, many state constitutions have stricter prohibitions of public
funding of religion than is required by the federal Establishment Clause. Such
prohibitions are not a violation of the constitutional right to “free exercise” of
religion because, as the Supreme Court has consistently recognized, there is a
“play in the joints” between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the
First Amendment.16 That is, some government actions are neither prohibited by
the Establishment Clause nor required by the Free Exercise Clause. This “play
in the joints” permits state governments to deny funding to religious institutions
even if funding them would be constitutionally permissible under the federal
Establishment Clause.

9

See Charles J. Cooper, Federalism: Importance of the States, 19 UPDATE ON L.-RELATED EDUC. 35, 35

(1995).
10

Id.
Id.
12
See Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Education Ass’n in Support of Respondents at 3, Trinity
Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) (No. 15-577).
13
See id. at 3–4 (quoting William J. Brennan, Jr. State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 (1977)).
14
See, e.g., Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1004–05 (Alaska 2008); People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1342
(N.Y. 1992); Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Education Ass’n, supra note 12.
15
See Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Education Ass’n, supra note 12, at 2.
16
Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
11

GOLLOMP_5.21.2019_PUBLICATION COPY

2019]

TRINITY LUTHERAN CHURCH v. COMER

5/21/2019 3:02 PM

1151

The leading case in this area of First Amendment jurisprudence, Locke v.
Davey,17 recognizes the necessity of the “play in the joints” and the importance
of federalism to protect state autonomy and antiestablishment interests without
violating the federal religion clauses. In Locke, the Court held that a Washington
state program was constitutional even though it offered state tax-funded
scholarships to secular, but not religious, studies.18 Washington refused to
provide scholarships to students pursuing degrees in vocational theology
because a state constitutional provision prohibited the use of public funds for
“any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious
establishment.”19 The Locke Court found that Washington could have permitted
students to receive scholarships for religious studies and it would not have
violated the Establishment Clause; yet at the same time, denying funds for a
religious degree did not violate the Free Exercise Clause.20 Thus, the Locke
framework implies that tax questions fall within the “play in the joints” and gives
states discretion regarding the extent to which they want to use state tax dollars
to support religion.21
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Trinity Lutheran
is problematic because it undercuts the federalism at work in Locke. The Locke
framework is the correct interpretation of the First Amendment’s religion
clauses because it recognizes the importance of federalism and state
antiestablishment interests and leaves religious funding issues for state
legislatures to resolve rather than the judiciary. To this end, this Comment
proceeds in three Parts. Part I provides an overview of the historical role
federalism has played in the First Amendment’s religion clause jurisprudence,
describes Supreme Court precedent in relation to government funding of
religion, and explains the concept of the “play in the joints” between the
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause. Part II examines the Trinity
Lutheran decision, how the Supreme Court distinguished the case from Locke,
why the Court reached this result, and what the implications may be going
forward. Part III shows how the Trinity Lutheran decision disregards federalism
and state antiestablishment interests and why that is problematic. This Comment
concludes that state programs that do not promote blatant inequality and
viewpoint discrimination of religion or clear favoritism of religion should fall
within the “play in the joints” and be left to state discretion such as in Locke.

17
18
19
20
21

540 U.S. 712, 719 (2004).
Id. at 715.
See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.
Locke, 540 U.S. at 719.
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1332 (5th ed. 2015).
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Accordingly, the Trinity Lutheran Court should have followed the decision in
Locke, leaving state tax issues sub-constitutional.
I.

OVERVIEW OF FEDERALISM AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

Federalism plays a significant role in First Amendment religion clause
jurisprudence. Notably, for much of American history, there were minimal
restrictions on state actions concerning religion. This Part traces the role that
federalism has played in the First Amendment’s religion clause jurisprudence
since the framing of the U.S. Constitution until the incorporation of the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses and significant Supreme Court precedent
such as Locke v. Davey.22 Section A discusses the historical significance that
federalism has played in religious liberty, as the religion clauses were not
believed to restrict state action regarding religion from the time of the framing
of the U.S. Constitution up until precedent such as Hamilton v. Regents of the
University of California, where the Court recognized that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment included aspects of religious liberty.23
Section B discusses the incorporation of the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses and their application to the states, demonstrating that even though the
Constitution became applicable to the states, the states still retained their
federalism interests. Section C provides a brief overview of the Supreme Court
religion clause precedent in relation to government funding of religion and
introduces the concept of the “play in the joints” that was coined in Walz v. Tax
Commission of New York,24 which concluded that specific government actions
are neither prohibited by the Establishment Clause nor required by the Free
Exercise Clause. This section also examines the issue of state variations on
religious aid caused by the Blaine Amendments. Section D discusses Locke v.
Davey, specifically discussing its federalist proposition that tax issues must be
sub-constitutional and left to the states rather than the federal courts.
A. Religious Liberty: From the Framing to the Incorporation of the
Fourteenth Amendment
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states, “Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof . . . .”25 The Amendment’s two clauses, known as the “Establishment

22
23
24
25

540 U.S. 712.
293 U.S. 245, 265 (1934) (Cardozo, J., concurring).
397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Clause” and the “Free Exercise Clause,” complement each other, protecting
religious beliefs and actions,26 while simultaneously ensuring that no single
religion is given preferential treatment over other faiths.27 The First Amendment
religion clauses are the backbone of religious freedom of both belief and actions
in America.28 America’s emphasis on religious liberty is firmly rooted in its
history,29 predating even the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.
The importance of federalism in religious liberty dates back to the time of
the Framers, who did not intend the religion clauses to apply to the states.30 In
fact, it has been said that “the only consensus among the Framers of the First
Amendment about the appropriate relationship between church and state was to
allow the states to decide the issue themselves.”31 The Tenth Amendment
confirmed the states could exercise all government powers except those reserved
to Congress or prohibited by the Constitution.32 On its face, the First
Amendment and its religion clauses applied only to Congress, so during the time
of the Framers, there were virtually no limitations on state actions concerning
religion.33 In fact, the text of the First Amendment itself begins “Congress shall
make no law . . . .”34 Notably, the First Amendment lacks any mention of the
states,35 implying that the Framers did not intend for the First Amendment to
impose restrictions on state action regarding religion.
Moreover, in the late 1700s, the lack of limitation on state actions concerning
religion went so far as to allow state establishment of religion.36 Many states had
government-established churches, some of which continued until the early
1800s.37 A prominent Supreme Court Justice at the time, Justice Joseph Story,
stated: “The whole power over the subject of religion is left exclusively to the
state governments, to be acted upon according to their own sense of justice and
the State Constitutions.”38 Throughout the next fifty years or so, the Supreme
26

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 1248.
See JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
EXPERIMENT 154 (4th ed. 2016).
28
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 1248.
29
Id.
30
See Poppel, supra note 7.
31
Id. (quoting Note, supra note 7).
32
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
33
Poppel, supra note 7.
34
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
35
Id.
36
See Poppel, supra note 7, at 252.
37
See id. For example, Vermont did not disestablish until 1807; Connecticut until 1818; Hew Hampshire
until 1819; and Massachusetts until 1833. Id. at 252 n.30.
38
Id. (quoting JOSEPH STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 597 (2d
27
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Court faced several cases regarding the religion clauses and the Bill of Rights as
a whole, and each time it determined that they did not bind the states.39 In
particular, in Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of New Orleans, the Court
determined that “[t]he Constitution makes no provision for protecting the
citizens of the respective states in their religious liberties; this is left to the state
constitutions and laws: nor is there any inhibition imposed by the Constitution
of the United States in this respect on the states.”40 These early cases, such as
Permoli, make clear that before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the religion clauses were not believed to restrict state action regarding religion.41
However, following Reconstruction and the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a debate was ignited concerning whether the religion clauses
restricted state regulation of religion.42 To this day, scholars and courts debate
whether the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment meant to make all or certain
provisions of the Bill of Rights, including the religion clauses, applicable to the
states through the Due Process Clause or Privileges and Immunities Clause.43
There are proponents in favor of the idea that the Framers intended total
incorporation, but many believe the Fourteenth Amendment was only intended
to incorporate certain provisions.44 The Supreme Court rejected the theory of
total incorporation of the Bill of Rights but applied many of the provisions to
the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
eventually including the First Amendment religion clauses.45
The Court first implied a limitation on state regulation of religion in the
dictum of Meyer v. Nebraska,46 where it noted that liberty as defined under the
Fourteenth Amendment includes the right “to worship God according to the

ed. 1851)).
39
See, e.g., Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475, 479–80 (1866); Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S.
(20 How.) 84, 89–91 (1857); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 76 (1855); Town of East Hartford v.
Hartford Bridge Co., 51 U.S. (10 How.) 511, 539–40 (1850); Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of New Orleans, 44
U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845); Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
40
44 U.S. (3 How.) at 609.
41
See Poppel, supra note 7, at 251.
42
Id. at 254–55.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 255–57.
46
262 U.S. 390 (1923). This case held that a Nebraska law, requiring public and private school instruction
to be in English and prohibited students who had not completed the eighth grade from studying a foreign
language, was a denial of equal protection of the law. Id. at 393. A teacher at a private Lutheran school was
convicted for teaching Bible stories in German. Id. at 396–97. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction,
primarily due to the rights of the parents to control their children’s education, but they also noted the right to
worship according to an individual’s own conscience in the decision’s dictum. Id. at 399–400.
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dictates of his own conscience.”47 The Supreme Court made this theory of
fundamental religious liberty even more explicit in Hamilton v. Regents of the
University of California.48 In Hamilton, state university students challenged
mandatory military training, which they believed violated their religious-based
refusal to participate in war.49 The objecting students claimed that their religious
beliefs, including the refusal to participate in war, were protected by the liberty
guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.50 The Hamilton
Court rejected the substance of the students’ appeal, but held that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment included “the right to entertain
the beliefs, to adhere to the principles and to teach the doctrines on which these
students base their objections to the order prescribing military training.”51 Thus,
Hamilton finally recognized that aspects of religious liberty are protected from
state action by the Due Process Clause, which paved the way for the
incorporation of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.52
B. The Incorporation of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses
The Supreme Court had “never applied the religion clauses of the First
Amendment to the states” until Cantwell v. Connecticut.53 That case54 was the
first time the Free Exercise Clause was applied to the states through its
incorporation into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.55 In
Cantwell, a Connecticut ordinance required licenses for individuals soliciting
for “any alleged religious, charitable or philanthropic cause.”56 The ordinance
gave discretion to local administrative officials to approve or deny licenses
based on their determination of whether the cause was “a bona fide object of
charity or philanthropy.”57 A group of Jehovah’s Witnesses did not obtain a
license before preaching door-to-door and was convicted of violating the city
ordinance.58 They argued that the license process violated their right to the free
exercise of religion.59 The Court determined that regulations on solicitation

47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

Id. at 399.
293 U.S. 245, 265 (1934).
Id. at 262.
Id.
Id. at 261–62.
Poppel, supra note 7, at 259.
Id. at 260 (quoting JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE BELIEVERS AND THE POWERS THAT ARE xiii (1987)).
310 U.S. 296 (1940).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 301–02.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 300.
Id.
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based on religious beliefs were forbidden, and ruled in favor of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses.60 In this landmark case, the Court incorporated the First
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause, making the free exercise principles applicable not only to federal
laws, but state and local laws as well.61
Just seven years later, the Establishment Clause was also incorporated into
the Due Process Clause and applied to the states in Everson v. Board of
Education.62 In Everson, the Court held that a local law that reimbursed parents
for transportation to parochial schools did not violate the constitutional
prohibition against state support of religion.63 Justice Black wrote:
The broad meaning given the [First] Amendment by these earlier cases
has been accepted by this Court in its decisions concerning an
individual’s religious freedom rendered since the Fourteenth
Amendment was interpreted to make the prohibitions of the First
applicable to state action abridging religious freedom. There is every
reason to give the same application and board interpretation to the
“establishment of religion” clause.64

Thus, the Court followed the footsteps of its Cantwell decision and held that the
Due Process Clause made the Establishment Clause binding on the states.65
The incorporation of the First Amendment religion clauses in Cantwell and
Everson shifted central authority over religious liberty from state courts to
federal courts,66 and in this Author’s opinion, further strengthened the “wall
between church and state.”67 Since the incorporation of the religion clauses, the
primary force shaping American religious liberty has been the federal courts,
particularly the Supreme Court.68 Despite the Framers’ intent, the Court has
frequently failed to take note of the idea that “civil authority in religious matters,
to the extent it could be exercised, was a state function.”69

60

Id. at 303.
Id.
62
330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947); WITTE, JR. & NICHOLS, supra note 27, at 114.
63
Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
64
Id. at 15.
65
See WITTE, JR. & NICHOLS, supra note 27, at 114.
66
Id. at 117.
67
Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
68
See Poppel, supra note 7, at 247–48.
69
Id. at 249 (quoting ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 45 (1990)).
61
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Once the religion clauses became binding on the states in the 1940’s, most
laws that affected religion became subject to First Amendment authority.70 But
this new subjection did not preclude states from passing laws affecting religious
institutions, including rules governing the subsidization of religious property
and schools, religious expression, taxation and tax exemptions, and more.71
Thus, even after incorporation, states were able to legislate around these issues,
and federalism still laid at the core of the First Amendment. The newly
incorporated First Amendment became a limitation on federal power in the same
way it acts as a limitation on state power.72 Since the 1990s, the authority over
American religious liberty has somewhat shifted from the federal government to
the states and away from courts to legislatures, due in part to the Supreme
Court’s emphasis on separation of powers and federalism,73 as highlighted in
precedent such as Employment Division v. Smith.74
C. Recent Religion Clause Jurisprudence and the “Play in the Joints”
Federalism issues continue to play a significant role in recent religion clause
jurisprudence, as evident in Walz v. Tax Commission of New York75 and Lemon
v. Kurtzman.76 One of the federalism issues the Supreme Court faces is the
tension between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, meaning that
sometimes the promotion of free exercise of religion may clash with the
Establishment Clause, and enforcement of the Establishment Clause may stifle
the free exercise of religion.
This tension between the religion clauses was explored in Walz.77 Here, the
plaintiffs argued that the tax exemption for religious property that was used
exclusively for religious worship violated the Establishment Clause.78 However,
the Court upheld the New York law that gave property tax exemptions for “real
70

See WITTE, JR. & NICHOLS, supra note 27, at 117.
Id.
72
See Poppel, supra note 7, at 247.
73
WITTE, JR. & NICHOLS, supra note 27, at 117, 149, 240.
74
494 U.S. 872 (1990). In this case, the claimants were members of a Native American Church who
ingested peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, as part of a sacramental ritual and were fired from their employment at
a drug rehabilitation center. Id. at 874. The Court rejected the notion that free exercise of religion required an
exemption from an otherwise valid and neutrally applicable law. Id. at 872. The Court also stated that those
seeking religious exemptions from laws should look to the political process rather than the courts. Id. at 890.
The Smith framework remains the controlling test for free exercise cases to this day, and demonstrates the
Court’s hesitancy to favor religious justifications for exemptions over secular justifications.
75
See 397 U.S. 664, 669–70 (1970).
76
See 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971).
77
397 U.S. at 669–70.
78
Id. at 664; see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 1299.
71
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or personal property used exclusively for religious, educational, or charitable
purposes.”79 The Court reasoned that the tax exemptions created “minimal and
remote involvement between church and state and far less than taxation of
churches,” because it reduced the financial involvement of the state and the
church.80
Most notably, the Walz Court established the concept of a “play in the joints”
between the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause.81 Chief Justice
Burger wrote: “We will not tolerate either governmentally established religion
or government interference with religion. Short of those expressly proscribed
government acts, there is ample room for play in the joints productive of a
benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without
sponsorship and without interference.”82 Specifically, Walz confirmed that tax
exemptions of religious organizations are not forbidden by the Establishment
Clause if similar organizations are also exempt; and taxation of religious
organizations is permitted under the Free Exercise Clause, as long as similar
organizations are taxed as well.83 In other words, the Walz Court recognized that
there are state actions that are neither prohibited by the Establishment Clause
nor required by the Free Exercise Clause. Since Walz, the Supreme Court has
consistently treated religious taxation issues as falling “in the joints” between
the religion clauses.84
Following Walz, the Court heard Lemon v. Kurtzman, in which it adopted a
formal three-prong test for the Establishment Clause.85 The Lemon test further
underscores the tension between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.86
Under the Lemon test, the government violates the Establishment Clause if its
primary purpose is to advance religion, or if the primary effect is to aid or inhibit
religion, or there is excessive entanglement with the government.87 Whenever
the government acts in a way that promotes the free exercise of religion, its
primary purpose is advancing or aiding religion, which is said to violate the
Lemon test.88 If the government creates an exemption to a law solely for a
religious organization or entity, one can argue that it violates the Establishment
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 1; Walz, 397 U.S. at 680; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 1299.
Walz, 397 U.S. at 676.
Id. at 669.
Id.
See WITTE, JR. & NICHOLS, supra note 27, at 240.
Id.
Lemon, 403 U.S. 602, 612–14 (1971).
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 1250.
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 1249–50.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 1250.
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Clause, but on the other hand, if the government does not create an exemption
for religion, it can also be argued that it violates the Free Exercise Clause.89 This
tension demonstrates the necessity of the “play in the joints,” meaning that states
should have discretion in determining how they want to treat religion,
particularly when it concerns state funds.
The “play in the joints” logic coined by the Walz Court gives states latitude
in determining how they want to spend taxpayer money and whether they want
to exempt religious organizations or use taxpayer funds to support religious
entities. However, many states have stricter constitutional restrictions than the
federal government regarding aid to religious institutions and individuals.90
These stricter restrictions are due to the “Blaine Amendments,”91 state
constitutional provisions that prohibit public funding of religion.92 While the
exact wording of the Blaine Amendments differs among states, the common
purpose is to prevent public money from supporting religious education and
institutions.93 Many states passed these amendments due to anti-Catholic
sentiment caused by the significant number of Roman Catholic parochial
schools that were emerging.94
Today, thirty-seven states have adopted Blaine Amendments, and thus have
stricter prohibitions on religious funding than the First Amendment religion
clauses themselves.95 Courts in states with Blaine Amendments have adopted
various methods of interpretation.96 Some courts have strictly enforced the
amendments, and some have interpreted them more leniently to allow certain
forms of aid.97 The different approaches across states raise the issue of whether
these Blaine Amendments fall within the “play in the joints,” and whether they
impair free exercise by favoring non-religion over religious practice.98

89
Id. (citing Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: Paradox Redux, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 123 (“arguing that
the tension between the [E]stablishment and [F]ree [E]xercise [C]lauses is inherent and difficult to reconcile”)).
90
See KENT GREENAWALT, WHEN FREE EXERCISE AND NONESTABLISHMENT CONFLICT 76 (2017).
91
Blaine Amendments are named after a failed U.S. Constitution amendment introduced by Senator
James Blaine of Maine in 1875. See Michael Bindas & Tim Keller, Answers to Frequently Asked Questions
About Blaine Amendments, INST. FOR JUSTICE, http://ij.org/issues/school-choice/blaine-amendments/answersfrequently-asked-questions-blaine-amendments/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2019). Although the proposed amendment
failed to pass in the Senate, many newly formed and existing states included similar language in their state
constitutions. Id.
92
See GREENAWALT, supra note 90.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 58.
95
Id. at 76.
96
Id. at 78.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 77.
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D. Locke v. Davey and State Funding of Religion
Locke v. Davey was the first time the Court expressly considered whether
the Blaine Amendments were constitutional.99 In Locke, the Court considered
the constitutionality of a Washington state program that offered Promise
Scholarships to children who were high achievers but could not afford college.100
The program, which was funded by state tax dollars, allowed recipients to go to
any accredited college, take any classes, and choose any major except for a
“devotional” major—one that provides training to become a minister.101
Washington prohibited using scholarships to pursue a devotional major because
its state constitution stated that “[n]o public money or property shall be
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise, or instruction, or
the support of any religious establishment.”102
The claimant, Joshua Davey, qualified for a Promise Scholarship and wanted
to pursue a double major in business administration and theology.103 However,
he was refused a scholarship for his theology major.104 He argued that the
scholarship program violated the Free Exercise Clause by allowing students to
receive a scholarship if they pursued secular, but not religious studies.105 Davey
claimed this unfairly targeted religious majors.106 Washington State argued the
program was defined as narrowly as possible, and even allowed recipients to
take theology courses or attend a religious college.107
In its decision, the Locke Court found that the scholarship was a neutral,
generally applicable law and did not show animus towards religion.108 The Court
determined that the state did not interfere with Davey’s free exercise rights
because he could still receive training to be a pastor without subsidization by the
government.109 The Locke Court noted the tension between the Establishment
Clause and Free Exercise Clause—that “[g]overnment actions to facilitate free
exercise might be challenged as impermissible establishments of religion, and
government efforts to refrain from establishing religion might be objected to as

99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

Id.
Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715–16 (2004).
Id. at. 717.
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.
Locke, 540 U.S. at 717.
Id.
Id. at 718.
See WITTE, JR. & NICHOLS, supra note 27, at 148.
Locke, 540 U.S. at 716.
Id. at 725.
Id. at 720–21 n.4.
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denying the free exercise of religion.”110 The majority specifically noted that the
state of Washington could have permitted students receiving scholarships to
pursue a devotional major if they had wished and it would not have violated the
Establishment Clause.111 At the same time, denying Davey scholarship money
to pursue a devotional degree did not violate the Free Exercise Clause.112 Thus,
the Court held that this issue fell within the “play in the joints” between the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.113 Locke’s holding is significant in
that it means that states have the choice of how they want to spend tax money
and the extent to which they wish to support religion financially.114 Locke
supports the proposition that tax questions need to be sub-constitutional and are
best left to the state political processes rather than the federal judiciary.115
However, the Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer decision seems to contradict
this proposition directly.116
II. THE TRINITY LUTHERAN CHURCH V. COMER DECISION
In the Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer decision, the Court departed from
its precedent, specifically Locke v. Davey, and held that in spite of Missouri’s
state constitutional provision forbidding government aid to religious institutions,
Missouri could not deny a state reimbursement grant to a church because of its
religious status.117 The Trinity Lutheran decision has prompted a wide range of
responses, from celebration to condemnation.118 Many have touted the decision
as a “significant victory for religious liberty,”119 an “affirm[ation of] the
founding principle[s]”120 and a “critical victory [for religious groups] in trying
to attain a level playing field when it comes to generally available public
110

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 1249.
Locke, 540 U.S. at 719.
112
Id. at 719–20.
113
Id. at 719.
114
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21.
115
Id.
116
137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
117
Id. at 2024–25.
118
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Symposium: The Crumbling Wall Separating Church and State,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2017, 10:18 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/symposium-crumbling-wallseparating-church-state/; Erin Morrow Hawley, Symposium: Putting Some Limits on the “Play in the Joints”,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2017, 5:28 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/symposium-putting-limits-playjoints/.
119
See Fred Yarger, Symposium: The Justices Reach Broad Agreement, but on a Narrow Question,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2017, 11:13 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/symposium-justices-reachbroad-agreement-narrow-question/.
120
See Nathan Diament, Symposium: Court Ruling Bolsters Religious Liberty . . . Beyond the Playground,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2017, 6:13 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/symposium-court-rulingbolsters-religious-liberty-beyond-playground/.
111
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benefits.”121 On the other hand, others have criticized the decision as
“oversimplified,”122 “a significant step towards dismantling the wall that
separates church and state,”123 and a “serious threat to religious freedom.”124
This Part examines the Trinity Lutheran decision and how the Supreme
Court distinguished the case from Locke, and explains why the Court reached
this result and what the implications may be going forward. Section A provides
an overview of Trinity Lutheran’s facts and procedural history. Section B
examines the Supreme Court’s decision, including the Justices’ dissents and
concurrences, and discusses why the Court decided the way it did and what
factors likely contributed to the outcome. Section C examines the likely
implications the Trinity Lutheran decision will have on state sovereignty,
federalism, religious freedom levels of scrutiny, and school voucher programs,
and addresses its devastating impact on federalism.
A. The Facts and History of Trinity Lutheran
The Trinity Lutheran Church Child Learning Center is a preschool and day
care facility in Missouri that is operated by Trinity Lutheran Church.125 Trinity
Lutheran had a playground with a “coarse pea gravel surface” below the
playground equipment.126 In 2012, Trinity Lutheran applied to replace the pea
gravel surface with a rubber surface through Missouri’s Scrap Tire Program.127
Missouri’s Department of Natural Resources ran the program and offered grants
to qualifying nonprofit organizations that install playground surfaces made of
recycled tires.128 However, the Department of Natural Resources had a strict
policy of denying grants to applicants controlled by religious entities, including
churches.129

121
See Hillary Byrnes, Symposium: The Constitution Provides a Level Playing Field for People of Faith,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2017, 10:56 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/symposium-constitutionprovides-level-playing-field-people-faith/.
122
See Leslie Griffin, Symposium: Bad News from Trinity Lutheran – Only Two Justices Support the
Establishment Clause, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2017, 5:44 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/
symposium-bad-news-trinity-lutheran-two-justices-support-establishment-clause/.
123
Chemerinsky, supra note 118.
124
See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer: A Serious Threat to Religious Freedom, AMS.
UNITED FOR SEPARATION CHURCH & ST., https://www.au.org/content/trinity-lutheran-church-of-columbia-vcomer-a-serious-threat-to-religious-freedom/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2019).
125
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2017 (2017).
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
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The Department’s policy was based on a Missouri constitutional provision
that prohibits financial assistance directly to religious entities:
[N]o money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or
indirectly, in aid of any church, sect, or denomination of religion, or in
aid of any priest, preacher, minister, or teacher thereof, as such; and
that no preference shall be given to nor any discrimination made
against any church, sect or creed of religion, or any form of religious
faith or worship.130

The constitutional provision had a strict separationist policy and prevented the
state from providing funding to any religious entity.131 Pursuant to this state
constitutional provision, the Missouri Department of Natural Resources denied
Trinity Lutheran’s application, although the department awarded fourteen grants
and Trinity Lutheran was ranked fifth out of the forty-four applicants.132
Trinity Lutheran sued in federal district court, alleging that the Department’s
denial of a grant based solely on religious status violated the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment.133 The district court dismissed the suit and
equated the case to Locke v. Davey, where the Supreme Court upheld against a
Free Exercise Clause challenge Washington state’s decision not to fund
devotional theology degrees.134 The district court held that the Free Exercise
Clause did not require Missouri to provide the grant to Trinity Lutheran.135
The Eighth Circuit affirmed,136 determining that the State of Missouri had
discretion whether to provide a grant to Trinity Lutheran and other religious
entities.137 In the view of the Eighth Circuit, the State could award grants to
religious entities without violating the Establishment Clause and could refuse to
provide grants to religious institutions without violating the Free Exercise
Clause.138 In other words, the Eighth Circuit believed this issue fell within the
“play in the joints.” In response to the Eighth Circuit’s decision, the Trinity
Lutheran Church filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, alleging that the public
benefit at issue—a grant for rubberized playground surfaces was “[far] removed
from the state’s antiestablishment concerns,” as it “serve[s] no religious function

130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

Id. (quoting MO. CONST. art. I, § 7).
Id.
Id. at 2018.
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 976 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1140 (W.D. Mo. 2013).
Id. at 1140, 1147 (citing Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715 (2004)).
Id. at 1155.
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 788 F.3d 779, 785 (8th Cir. 2015).
Id.
Id.
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or purpose.”139 Additionally, numerous interested parties filed amicus curiae
briefs in support of both the Trinity Lutheran Church and the Missouri
Department of Natural Resources.140 Their assertions ranged from concerns that
the government was discriminating solely on the basis of religion141 to
objections to the use of taxpayer funds to support religious activities.142
B. The Supreme Court Decision
On January 15, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court granted Trinity Lutheran’s
petition for certiorari sub nom.143 Unfortunately, just a month after the Supreme
Court granted certiorari, Justice Antonin Scalia passed away.144 With an eightmember Court, it was uncertain how the case would be decided.145 But this
turned out to be of no concern since the case remained in limbo until Justice
Gorsuch’s confirmation.146 Just twelve days after his confirmation, the Supreme
Court heard oral arguments for the case.147 With a complete panel of nine
Justices, the Court reversed, with a 7–2 decision in favor of Trinity Lutheran
Church.148

139
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1–2, Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S.
Ct. 2012 (2017) (No. 15-577).
140
See, e.g., Amicus Brief of the American Center for Law & Justice in Support of Petitioners, Trinity
Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (No. 15-577); Brief of Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union et al.
in Support of Respondent, Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (No. 15-577); Brief of Amicus Curiae
Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission in Support of Petitioner, Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (No.
15-577); Brief of Religious & Civil Rights Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Trinity
Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (No. 15-577).
141
See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission, supra note 140, at 15.
142
See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 140, at 19.
143
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/
case-files/cases/trinity-lutheran-church-of-columbia-inc-v-pauley/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2019).
144
Richard W. Garnett & Jackson C. Blais, Religious Freedom and Recycled Tires: The Meaning and
Implications of Trinity Lutheran, 2016 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 105, 111 (2016–2017); Eva Ruth Moravec et al.,
The Death of Antonin Scalia: Chaos, Confusion and Conflicting Reports, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/texas-tv-station-scalia-died-of-a-heart-attack/2016/02/14/938e2170d332-11e5-9823-02b905009f99_story.html?utm_term=.09018f133903.
145
See Ron Elving, On the Docket, in Limbo: Scalia’s Death Casts Uncertainty on Key Cases, NPR (Feb.
14, 2016, 11:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/02/14/466752491/on-the-docket-in-limbo-scalias-death-castsuncertainty-on-key-cases.
146
See Lisa Mascaro & David G. Savage, Senate Confirms Neil Gorsuch, Trump’s Supreme Court
Nominee, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017, 2:10 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-gorsuch-confirmed20170407-story.html.
147
See Jeffrey Toobin, The Conservative Agenda for Gorsuch’s First Week, NEW YORKER (Apr. 18, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-conservative-agenda-for-gorsuchs-first-week.
148
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2025 (2017).
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The opinion of the Court was delivered by Chief Justice Roberts, except as
to footnote three.149 In the opinion, the Court determined that the Department’s
policy discriminated against “otherwise eligible recipients by disqualifying them
from a public benefit solely because of their religious character.”150 The State of
Missouri argued that the State’s decision to “merely declin[e] to extend funds”
and provide the grant did not pose any substantial burden on the Trinity Lutheran
Church’s free exercise rights because it left it able to practice its religious
beliefs.151 Chief Justice Roberts rejected the State’s argument.152 The Court
distinguished the Locke v. Davey decision on which the lower courts relied:
Davey was not denied a scholarship because of who he was; he was
denied a scholarship because of what he proposed to do – use the funds
to prepare for the ministry. Here there is no question that Trinity
Lutheran was denied a grant simply because of what it is—a church.153

The Court used this “who you are” versus “what you do” distinction and
emphasized that the student in Locke was still able to obtain a secular degree
using the scholarship while studying devotional theology at another school.154
In this case, however, the Court framed the issue to say that Trinity Lutheran
was put to a choice of “participat[ing] in an otherwise available benefit program
or remain[ing] a religious institution.”155 Citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. Hialeah and McDaniel v. Paty, the Court determined that this kind of
policy triggers “the most exacting scrutiny.”156 Because the State was unable to
offer any “state interest of the highest order,”157 the Court held that the
Department’s policy violated the Free Exercise Clause.158 Despite the evident
federalism concerns implicated by the Court’s choice to override the State of
Missouri’s decision, the Court failed to acknowledge the underlying federalism
concerns in its decision. Interestingly, several Justices who are members of the
Federalist Society were indifferent to Missouri’s state prohibitions on public
funding of religion.159 Despite this seemingly broad holding, the opinion
149

Id. at 2016. Footnote three will be discussed below.
Id. at 2027.
151
Id. at 2022; see also Garnett & Blais, supra note 144, at 114.
152
Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2022; see also Garnett & Blais, supra note 144, at 114.
153
Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2023.
154
Id.; see also Garnett & Blais, supra note 144, at 115.
155
Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2021–22.
156
Id. at 2021. See generally Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
(reasoning that certain laws that burden religious practices must be evaluated under strict scrutiny standard);
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (applying “close” scrutiny to a statute prohibiting ministers from serving
as delegates to state’s constitutional conventions).
157
Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2024 (citing McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 628).
158
Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2024–25.
159
See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer: Dodging on the Playground,
150
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included a mysterious footnote three which purported to limit the decision: “This
case involves express discrimination based on religious identity with respect to
playground resurfacing. We do not address religious uses of funding or other
forms of discrimination.”160 Despite its attempt to limit the decision’s breadth,
footnote three was only joined by four Justices and is not the opinion of the
Court.161
In a short concurrence, Justice Thomas joined the Court’s opinion except as
to footnote three, stating that even a “mil[d] kind” of discrimination against
religion is troubling and that the Court properly construed Locke narrowly.162
Justice Gorsuch also joined the Court’s opinion except for footnote three, stating
that “the general principles here do not permit discrimination against religious
exercise—whether on the playground or anywhere else.”163 Justice Breyer also
concurred in the judgment, emphasizing that the scrap tire program was designed
to improve the safety and health of children.164 He likened the “public benefit”
at issue to government services such as police and fire protection, and argued
Trinity Lutheran should not be excluded from the public benefit.165 However,
Justice Breyer limited his decision and wanted to “leave the application of the
Free Exercise Clause to other kinds of public benefits for another day.”166
Justice Sotomayor dissented, with only Justice Ginsburg joining her
dissent.167 Justice Sotomayor believed the requirement of state funding to a
religious institution violated the Establishment Clause:
This case is about nothing less than the relationship between religious
institutions and the civil government—that is between church and
state. The Court today profoundly changes that relationship by
holding, for the first time, that the Constitution requires the
government to provide public funds directly to a church. Its decision
slights both our precedent and our history, and its reasoning weakens

GEO. WASH. L. REV. ON THE DOCKET (July 5, 2017), http://www.gwlr.org/trinity-lutheran-church-v-comer/.
160
Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2024 n.3.
161
Id. at 2016, 2024 n.3.
162
Id. at 2025 (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (quoting Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720 (2004)); see
Garnett & Blais, supra note 144, at 116.
163
Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2026 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part); see also Garnett & Blais,
supra note 144, at 116–17.
164
Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2026–27 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
165
Id. at 2027.
166
Id.; see also Garnett & Blais, supra note 144, at 117.
167
Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2027 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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this country’s longstanding commitment to a separation of church and
state beneficial to both.168

Thus, in Justice Sotomayor’s perspective, Trinity Lutheran is more than just a
case about playground resurfacing; it is a decision holding that the Constitution
requires the government to provide public funds directly to a church, which
weakens the separation between church and state.169
Justice Sotomayor made two key points. First, she argued that contrary to
both the Church and the Department’s concessions, “[t]he Establishment Clause
does not allow Missouri to grant the Church’s funding request because the
Church uses the Learning Center, including its playground, in conjunction with
its religious mission.”170 She argued that the Court’s precedent establishes that
“[t]he government may not directly fund religious exercise” and thus the grant
would violate the Establishment Clause.171 Second, Justice Sotomayor argued
that Missouri’s religion-based line-drawing was acceptable, and compared the
case to Locke v. Davey.172 “As was true in Locke, a prophylactic rule against the
use of public funds for houses of worship is a permissible accommodation of
those weighty interests [of taxpayers].”173 Thus, she believed the refusal to
provide the grant to the church was not in violation of the Establishment Clause.
Justice Sotomayor argued that the Court’s judgment created the rule that
“[t]he government may draw lines on the basis of religious status to grant a
benefit to religious persons or entities but it may not draw lines on that basis
when doing so would further the interests the religion clauses protect in other
ways.”174 From her perspective, this “lopsided outcome” brushes aside centuries
of judicial history and “jeopardizes the government’s ability to remain
secular.”175 Finally, Justice Sotomayor warned of what the Trinity Lutheran
decision “might enable tomorrow,” fearing that the decision could be
manipulated to enable government funding of religion in other ways.176
On its face, the issue presented in Trinity Lutheran seems relatively simple:
whether the State of Missouri must provide a reimbursement grant to replace pea

168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2028.
Id.
Id. at 2036.
Id.
Id. at 2040.
Id. at 2040–41.
Id. at 2041 n.14.
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gravel with scrap tire on a church-run preschool’s playground.177 As Chief
Justice Roberts wrote, the literal consequence of this policy “is, in all likelihood,
a few extra scraped knees.”178 However, as Justice Sotomayor’s dissent pointed
out, the issue is much more complex. The Trinity Lutheran decision raised the
question of whether state Blaine Amendments should be constitutionally invalid
or whether the Supreme Court should embrace the “play in the joints” approach
adopted in Locke v. Davey and allow states discretion in providing aid to
religious institutions.179 In other words, the question is whether the First
Amendment allows states to deny an otherwise-available benefit to a religious
institution because of its religious status.180
Specific external factors likely shaped the outcome in favor of Trinity
Lutheran Church. First, the case included the ideal set of facts in favor of the
church—children, health, and safety. It is very challenging to issue an opinion
in opposition to those interests.181 Second, in addition to the set of “good facts,”
the Church’s argument was framed in terms of discrimination,182 which likely
helped Chief Justice Roberts win over some of the more moderate and leftleaning Justices. Third, the inclusion of footnote three was also a probable factor
in obtaining the approval of those Justices.183 Finally, the shift in the Supreme
Court’s membership since Locke v. Davey, particularly the addition of Justice
Gorsuch contributed to the decision’s outcome. It is striking to note, particularly
in the current tumultuous political climate, that, as some would characterize it,
a seven-Justice plurality ruled that the Constitution requires the government to
provide funding directly to a church.

177

Id. at 2014.
Id. at 2024–25.
179
Id. at 2019.
180
Id. at 2015.
181
See Mark Sherman, Playground Case Touches on Separation of Church and State, HAMODIA (Apr. 20,
2017, 3:19 PM), https://hamodia.com/2017/04/20/playground-case-touches-separation-church-state/ (“All
we’re talking about is a safer surface on the playground for when kids play.”); Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court
Rules Religious Schools Can Use Taxpayer Funds for Playground, NPR (June 26, 2017, 10:28 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2017/06/26/534084013/supreme-court-rules-religious-school-can-use-taxpayer-funds-forplayground (“[T]he government in this case ‘is not being asked to fund a religious activity. It’s funding the
playground where students play.’”).
182
Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2021.
183
Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Justices Leaning Toward a Ruling for Trinity Lutheran on the Merits,
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 19, 2017, 2:14 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/04/argument-analysis-justicesleaning-toward-ruling-trinity-lutheran-merits/.
178
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C. Implications Going Forward
The Trinity Lutheran decision is likely to have far-reaching implications for
the Supreme Court’s religion clause jurisprudence. The decision is likely to have
a detrimental impact on federalism and state sovereignty, potentially implies a
doctrinal shift to a level of stricter scrutiny over free exercise cases, and has a
potential impact on school voucher programs and school choice initiatives.
First, one of the most notable implications is the impact the Trinity Lutheran
ruling will have on state sovereignty and federalism, particularly regarding
states’ ability to limit the funding they provide to religious organizations and
institutions. The decision means that religious organizations cannot be denied
government aid simply because of their religious character, despite state
opposition to providing funding or a state constitutional provision that dictates
otherwise. Thirty-eight states have constitutional provisions restricting aid to
religious institutions, and Trinity Lutheran suggests that those provisions may
no longer be constitutional.184 It is uncertain what the future holds for these state
constitutional provisions, including Blaine Amendments. As it currently stands,
the decision created a lack of clarity on how states may provide funding or refuse
to provide funding without violating the Free Exercise Clause.
Second, the decision seems to imply a doctrinal shift to a level of stricter
scrutiny over free exercise cases, as also evidenced by the recent decisions of
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC185 and
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.186 In Hosanna-Tabor the Supreme Court
created a “ministerial exception” and upheld the right of religious organizations
to have autonomy to hire and fire people as they see fit.187 In Hobby Lobby, the
Court held that Hobby Lobby, a closely held corporation, had standing as a
“person” under the statutory definition of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA) and thus was not required to provide its employees with mandatory
health insurance covering four contraceptive methods that target fertilized
eggs.188 Hobby Lobby is significant because it expanded religious freedom
claims under RFRA to for-profit corporations.189 These recent decisions,
coupled with Trinity Lutheran, seem to suggest a sea change, a deviation from
Smith neutrality to a return of a stricter scrutiny regime and a movement towards
184
See Charles J. Russo & William E. Thro, Blessed Trinity: Implications of Trinity Lutheran Church of
Columbia v. Comer for Religious Liberty, 44 RELIGION & EDUC. 247, 256 (2017).
185
565 U.S. 171 (2012).
186
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
187
565 U.S. at 195–96.
188
134 S. Ct. at 2755.
189
Id.

GOLLOMP_5.21.2019_PUBLICATION COPY

1170

5/21/2019 3:02 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 68:1147

accommodation of religion. However, it remains to be seen how far the Court
will go towards a return to a stricter scrutiny regime. Thus, the uncertainty from
the decision is likely to generate an influx of litigation to determine the exact
extent of the decision and where the relationship between the Establishment
Clause and Free Exercise Clause stands.
Third, the decision will likely have a vast impact on school voucher
programs and school choice initiatives. After Trinity Lutheran, it seems that if
state programs choose to provide special benefits to private schools, they must
provide religiously affiliated private schools the same treatment on an equal
basis.190 This requirement will necessitate that already scarce taxpayer dollars
must cover students enrolled in religious private schools in addition to
nonreligious schools.191 Whenever a state has a voucher program for
nonreligious private schools, Trinity Lutheran suggests that religiously affiliated
schools must also be included.192 While footnote three purported to limit the
judgment to playground resurfacing and emphasized that the decision does not
apply to school vouchers or other forms of funding,193 the Court’s actions
following the decision seem to suggest otherwise. Strikingly, the day after the
decision was handed down, the Supreme Court issued grant and vacate orders in
four school voucher cases for “further consideration in light of Trinity
Lutheran.”194 These cases construed state constitutions to exclude the use of
vouchers at religious schools.195 One was a case from the Supreme Court of New
Mexico and the other three were from the Supreme Court of Colorado.196 The
vacated New Mexico Supreme Court decision, Moses v. Skandera, ruled that the
State’s donation of free textbooks to private school students violated the state
constitutional provision prohibiting state mineral funds to be used for the support
of sectarian, denominational, or private schools.197 On remand, the court
determined that in light of Trinity Lutheran, the textbook loan program provides

190

See Russo & Thro, supra note 184, at 257.
Id.
192
Id.
193
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024 n.3 (2017).
194
See Order List: Certiorari – Summary Dispositions, 582 U.S. (2017), https://www.supremecourt.gov/
orders/courtorders/062717zr_6537.pdf.
195
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 159.
196
See Russo & Thro, supra note 184, at 257; Arianna Prothero, Why We Should Expect More Lawsuits
Over
Private
School
Vouchers,
EDUC. WK. BLOG (June
30,
2017,
9:00
AM),
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/charterschoice/2017/06/expect_more_lawsuits_over_private_school_vouchers
.html?cmp=soc-edit-tw&print=1.
197
367 P.3d 838, 839 (N.M. 2015), cert. granted, vacated sub nom. N.M. Ass’n of Nonpub. Sch. v. Moses,
137 S. Ct. 2325 (2017).
191
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a generally available public benefit to students and does not result in the use of
public funds in support of private schools and is therefore constitutional.198
The vacated Colorado Supreme Court decision in Taxpayers for Public
Education v. Douglas County School District199 was dismissed by the Colorado
Supreme Court following the Court’s remand.200 In that case, the Colorado
Supreme Court ruled that a voucher program in Douglas County was
unconstitutional because it allowed students to use public funds towards tuition
at private schools, and over 90% of the scholarship recipients attended religious
schools.201 The Colorado Supreme Court found that the scholarship program
violated the Colorado Constitution, which barred governmental assistance to
religious schools.202 Following the Court’s remand, the Colorado Supreme Court
dismissed the case due to the newly elected Douglas County school board’s
decision to end the voucher program and the pending litigation.203 Although the
Trinity Lutheran Court failed to provide clear guidance on when a state violates
the Free Exercise Clause regarding government support of religion, the facts of
Trinity Lutheran are very different from the Douglas County facts.204
Despite the outcomes of Moses and Douglas County, the remanding of these
cases begs the question of whether the Trinity Lutheran decision will aid the
school choice movement that has been hampered in the past by state
constitutional provisions, including Blaine Amendments.205 The decision is
likely to invite an influx of litigation regarding school choice. While the Trinity
Lutheran ruling does not necessarily mean that these constitutional provisions
will be nullified across the states, it will undoubtedly encourage challenges to
constitutional provisions and state laws that prohibit school choice programs.
For instance, if Trinity Lutheran is interpreted as Justices Gorsuch and Thomas
would like, religiously affiliated charter schools that are supported with public
funding may have a free exercise right to engage in religious practice and

198

Moses v. Ruszkowski, No. S-1-SC-34974, 2018 WL 6566646, at *1 (N.M. Dec. 13, 2018).
351 P.3d 461 (Colo. 2015), cert. granted, vacated sub nom. Doyle v. Taxpayers for Pub. Educ., 137 S.
Ct. 2324 (2017).
200
Liz Hayes, Colorado Supreme Court Ends Douglas County School Voucher Lawsuit, a Win for Public
Education and Religious Freedom, AMS. UNITED FOR SEPARATION CHURCH & ST. (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.
au.org/blogs/wall-of-separation/colorado-supreme-court-ends-douglas-county-school-voucher-lawsuit-a-win.
201
Douglas Cty., 351 P.3d at 466.
202
Id. at 475.
203
Hayes, supra note 200.
204
Compare Douglas Cty., 351 P.3d at 475, with Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer,
137 S. Ct. 2012, 2017–18 (2017).
205
See Richard D. Komer, Trinity Lutheran and the Future of Educational Choice: Implications for State
Blaine Amendments, 44 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 551 (2018).
199
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teaching.206 The ruling could also potentially extend to higher education and
universities, and contrary to Locke, may require states to provide funding for
religious institutions or religious degree programs.
Interestingly, in March 2019, the Supreme Court avoided an opportunity to
expand on the Trinity Lutheran ruling when it denied certiorari to Morris County
Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Freedom from Religion Foundation.207 The
denial of certiorari leaves in place a New Jersey Supreme Court ruling that
prohibited a county from using public funds to provide historical preservation
grants to religious institutions.208 In light of the denial of certiorari, conservative
Justices Kavanaugh, Gorsuch, and Alito issued a statement in opposition of the
lower court ruling: “Barring religious organizations because they are religious
from a general historic preservation grants program is pure discrimination
against religion.”209 This statement seems to indicate that although certiorari was
denied in this particular case, the Justices would invite a future opportunity to
expand on the Trinity Lutheran decision in the future, potentially providing
religious institutions with greater opportunities to receive public funding.210
III. HOW THE TRINITY LUTHERAN DECISION UNDERMINES FEDERALISM
Despite the seeming consensus of the Justices, the Court reached the wrong
conclusion in the Trinity Lutheran judgment. The decision undercuts the
federalism at work in Locke v. Davey and undermines the separation between
religious freedom and governmental authority. The majority opinion weakens
state sovereignty concerning state antiestablishment interests. Although the
dissent reached the correct result in determining that Missouri was not required
to provide the grant to the church, the dissent incorrectly based its argument on
the proposition that the grant violated the Establishment Clause, rather than
recognizing that the discretion of whether to provide the grant should be left to
the state.
Section A discusses Missouri’s antiestablishment interests in its decision to
refuse to provide state tax funds to a religious organization as well as the new
federalist revolution in the Court’s general jurisprudence in the past generation.
206

Id.
Andrew Chung, U.S. High Court Turns Away Religious Rights Case Over Church Grants, REUTERS
(Mar. 4, 2019, 9:47 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-religion/u-s-high-court-turns-awayreligious-rights-case-over-church-grants-idUSKCN1QL1I1; see Morris Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v.
Freedom from Religion Found., 139 S. Ct. 909 (2019) (mem.).
208
Chung, supra note 207.
209
Morris Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 139 S. Ct. at 911; see also Chung, supra note 207.
210
Chung, supra note 207.
207
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Section B discusses the proposition that federal courts should leave discretion
for tax issues to the states unless there is clear favoritism or bald discrimination
of religion, neither of which occurred in Trinity Lutheran. Section C compares
Trinity Lutheran to precedent that held state programs do not promote clear
favoritism or bald discrimination of religion, and instead fall within the “play in
the joints,” such as Walz v. Tax Commission of New York and Locke v. Davey.
Section D explores how the Court in Trinity Lutheran allowed the church to use
the Free Exercise Clause as a “heckler’s veto” of state spending in accordance
with its state constitutional Blaine Amendment restrictions. Section E addresses
other federalism concerns caused by the Trinity Lutheran decision, such as the
importance of local autonomy and the ability of state and local governments to
conduct fact-finding and implement tailored policies. This Comment argues that
the choice of how to use state taxpayer money should be left to each state’s
discretion unless a state is displaying bald favoritism of religion or bald
discrimination against religion.211
A. State Antiestablishment Interests and New Federalism
In Trinity Lutheran, the State of Missouri’s refusal to provide a grant to a
church for a rubberized playground surface based on its state constitutional
provision of denying grants to religious institutions was neither bald
discrimination against religion nor favoritism. In refusing the grant, the state was
upholding a long-standing state policy to enforce the state’s antiestablishment
interests. As the Court of Appeals observed, the State of Missouri “has a long
history of maintaining a very high wall between church and state.”212 The Trinity
Lutheran opinion did not adequately address the antiestablishment issues,
remarking only that “[t]he parties agree that the Establishment Clause of [the
First] Amendment does not prevent Missouri from including Trinity Lutheran in
the Scrap Tire Program.”213 However, just because “the parties agree” that there
was no Establishment Clause violation does not mean that the state does not
have an important antiestablishment interest in preventing the funds from going
to a religious organization. Faithfulness to the state’s antiestablishment ideal
requires the state to draw lines between religious and nonreligious institutions.
This line drawing is necessary and is not based on animus or intentional
discrimination against any particular religion, or against religion in general.
211
Cf. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Federalism and Faith, 56 EMORY L.J. 19, 67–83 (2006); Jesse R.
Merriam, Finding a Ceiling in a Circular Room: Locke v. Davey, Federalism, and Religious Neutrality, 16
TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 103, 106 (2006).
212
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 788 F.3d 779, 783 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 364 F. Supp. 376, 383–84 (W.D. Mo. 1973), aff’d, 419 U.S. 888 (1974)).
213
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 (2017).
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The way in which the First Amendment religion clauses are applied to the
states determines the amount and manner of control over religion-based and
religion-influenced policies of state and local governments.214 In failing to
address Missouri’s Establishment Clause concerns, the Trinity Lutheran
majority disregards the State’s antiestablishment interests and considerations of
federalism more broadly. Federalism is the principle that power should be
divided between the federal government and the state governments.215 The Tenth
Amendment provides that the powers not delegated to the federal government
or prohibited to the states are expressly reserved to the states.216 Constitutional
provisions specify separate domains of authority for both state and federal
governments.217 While the exact division of authority is up for debate, it is
necessary for the federal government to leave some autonomy to the states, for
reasons such as the promotion of political participation, self-government,
integration of public policy and local views, reasons of comity, and avoidance
of concentration of powers.218 Taxation is a concurrent power, one of the powers
that is shared by both state and federal governments.219
In the past generation, there has been a neo-federalist revolution in the
Supreme Court’s general jurisprudence.220 Many recent seminal cases, such as
United States v. Lopez,221 Seminole Tribe v. Florida,222 Alden v. Maine,223 Printz
v. United States,224 and City of Boerne v. Flores225 are decisions in which the
Court has limited federal power to subject states to congressional control.226
These cases demonstrate the Court’s commitment to “new federalism” arising

214

See Ira C. Lupu, Federalism and Faith Redux, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 935, 935 (2010).
See ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, M-149, A FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING
THE CONTROVERSY CONCERNING THE FEDERAL COURTS AND FEDERALISM 13 (1986).
216
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
217
ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 215.
218
Id.
219
See Federalism, USLEGAL, https://system.uslegal.com/federalism/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2019).
220
See Sandra L. Lynch & Christopher DeFrancis, The New Federalism, 44 BOS. B.J. 8, 8 (2000).
221
See generally 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down an act of Congress as falling outside its Commerce
Clause authority). The Lopez decision was the first in almost sixty years to reach this conclusion. See Allison H.
Eid, Teaching New Federalism, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 875, 875 (2005).
222
See generally 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress cannot abrogate the states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity when acting under its Article I powers); see also Lynch & DeFrancis, supra note 220.
223
See generally 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Article I does not provide Congress with the power to
subject nonconsenting states to private suits in state court); see also Lynch & DeFrancis, supra note 220.
224
See generally 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that the federal government cannot make state officials
carry out federal policy); see also Leon Friedman, Supreme Court Federalism Decisions, 16 TOURO L. REV.
243, 246 (2000).
225
See generally 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that Congress exceeded its Section 5 power when it enacted
RFRA); see also Lynch & DeFrancis, supra note 220.
226
See Lynch & DeFrancis, supra note 220.
215
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from the Commerce Clause, the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, and Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, which all limit congressional power.227
Chief Justice Rehnquist has described these cases as determining the “distinction
between what is truly national and what is truly local.”228 This federalist
resurgence has been reflected in the Court’s weakening of the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses after Employment Division v. Smith in 1990.229 Since
Smith, the authority over religious liberty has shifted from the federal
government to the states and away from courts to legislatures, due in part to the
Supreme Court’s recent emphasis on separation of powers and federalism.230
In fact, Justices such as Justice Thomas have pressed for the selective
disincorporation of the Establishment Clause, suggesting that the Framers
intended the Establishment Clause to leave full discretion and no limitations
regarding religion to the states.231 Disincorporation of the First Amendment
religion clauses would occur if the Supreme Court held that the states were no
longer bound by either or both of the religion clauses.232 While a total
disincorporation of the First Amendment religion clauses would not adequately
ensure religious liberty in the United States, it would be favorable if the federal
government relaxed its control over religion-based state and local policies and
left the discretion to the states, particularly regarding states’ own tax dollars. It
is essential to recognize the importance of federalism and states’ interests in
prohibiting funding of religion in the way that the Establishment Clause itself
does.
The issue of state taxes and government funding of religion presented in
Trinity Lutheran should fall in the “play in the joints” space. In other words,
providing a state-funded grant for a religious organization’s playground would
not violate the Establishment Clause, but the denial of a grant to a religious
organization would not violate the Free Exercise Clause either. The Supreme
Court has consistently treated religious taxation issues as falling “in the joints”
between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.233 In other words, tax
exemptions of religious organizations are not forbidden by the Establishment
Clause if similar organizations are also exempt; and taxation of religious

227

See Theodore W. Ruger, New Federalism: Introduction, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 89, 89 (2004).
Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995)).
229
See generally Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that the
Free Exercise Clause allows a state to prohibit drug use for sacramental purposes).
230
WITTE, JR. & NICHOLS, supra note 27, at 2.
231
Lupu, supra note 214, at 936.
232
Id. at 935–36.
233
WITTE, JR. & NICHOLS, supra note 27, at 240.
228
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organizations is permitted under the Free Exercise Clause, as long as similar
organizations are taxed as well. Federal courts should give states deference to
determine their own antiestablishment interests if their decisions do not result in
discrimination or favoritism to specific beliefs or practices.
Without federal courts’ interference, states, subject to their own state
constitutions, should determine whether and how to support religiously affiliated
educational or social services financially. As previously discussed, most states
have their own antiestablishment constitutional provisions, such as the Blaine
Amendments. These constitutional provisions were democratically proposed
and adopted, and were intended to protect the same interests as the
Establishment Clause.234 These provisions recognize states’ significant
antiestablishment concerns that are firmly rooted in American history. As James
Madison opined, the Framers thought it tyrannical to “force a citizen to
contribute three pence only” to support a religion of which they were not a
participant.235 This historical basis is the reason why “[m]ost States that sought
to avoid an establishment of religion around the time of the founding placed in
their constitutions formal prohibitions against using tax funds to support the
ministry.”236 In creating the religion clauses, the Framers sought to protect
religion from interference by the government and, at the same time, to protect
citizens from the tyranny of a state religion and from paying taxes to support a
religion in which they did not participate.
In fact, the use of public funds for construction of church property or for
religious instruction have long been said to encompass a strong
antiestablishment interest. As explained in Everson v. Board of Education, “[t]he
imposition of taxes to pay ministers’ salaries and to build and maintain churches
and church property aroused [the Framers’] indignation. It was those feelings
which found expressions in the First Amendment.”237 These historical concerns
regarding the use of tax funds to support building church property or aid in
religious instruction are clearly implicated in Trinity Lutheran, as the grant
would be used to improve a church facility, would indirectly aid in religious
instruction by supporting a preschool that is a “ministry of the Church,” and

234
See Richard B. Katskee, Symposium: Religious Freedom, Not Religious Discrimination,
SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 11, 2016, 9:18 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/08/symposium-religious-freedomnot-religious-discrimination/.
235
Id.
236
Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 723 (2004); Brief of Religious & Civil Rights Organizations, supra
note 140, at 9 (quoting Locke, 540 U.S. at 723).
237
330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947).
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promoting a program that “allow[s] a child to grow spiritually.”238 Furthermore,
even if the money used for the playground is for secular use, as the Church
alleges that a playground surface is, that does not change the fact that money is
fungible. In other words, the less money the Church must spend on resurfacing
its playground, the more money it is able to spend on sectarian uses, such as
religious services. These sectarian uses of state taxpayer dollars implicate state
antiestablishment concerns.
B. No Bald Favoritism or Clear Discrimination of Religion
These historical concerns make clear that states such as Missouri have a
legitimate interest in furthering these antiestablishment interests when enacting
and complying with their state constitutional provisions that prohibit public
funding of religion. The fact that a state has stricter constitutional provisions
than the Establishment Clause itself does not mean that the state is
discriminating against religion. In Trinity Lutheran, there was no intent to
discriminate or display animus towards any particular religion. Instead, there
was a more cautious discrepancy in judgment in how far the government can go
to support religion. This so-called “discrimination” is a necessary line drawing
between religious and nonreligious institutions to be faithful to
antiestablishment ideals. These strong antiestablishment interests mean that
federal courts should leave the discretion for tax issues to the states unless there
is clear favoritism of religion or specific religious organizations239 or clear
discrimination against religion.240
Bald favoritism of religion in relation to state tax exemptions and funding is
a violation of the First Amendment, as demonstrated in Texas Monthly, Inc. v.
Bullock.241 In Texas Monthly, religious organizations were exempt from paying
sales taxes on periodicals or publications promoting or teaching religion, yet the
sales tax exemption was not given to nonreligious publications.242 Texas
Monthly magazine did not qualify for the religious tax exemption and sued the
State, claiming that the tax exemptions violated the Establishment Clause.243
The Court held that under the First Amendment, a state could provide a tax

238

Brief of Religious & Civil Rights Organizations, supra note 140, at 11–12.
Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989) (holding that a sales tax exemption for publication
advancing tenants of religious faith violates the Establishment Clause).
240
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845 (1995) (holding that a state
could not discriminate in a public forum based on a religious viewpoint).
241
Tex. Monthly, 489 U.S. at 5.
242
Id.
243
Id. at 6.
239
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exemption only if the exemption had a secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advanced nor inhibited religion.244 In Texas Monthly, the tax
exemption had no secular purpose and served to subsidize religious teachings.245
The Texas Monthly Court distinguished Walz v. Tax Commission of New York,246
in which New York property tax exemptions used for religious, educational, or
charitable purposes were upheld.247 In Walz, “the benefits derived by religious
organizations flowed to a large number of nonreligious groups as well.”248 The
benefits in Walz were given to both religious and nonreligious groups; whereas,
the tax exemption in Texas Monthly applied only to religious groups.249 Justice
Brennan, writing for the plurality, explained:
Insofar as that subsidy is conferred upon a wide array of nonsectarian
groups as well as religious organizations . . ., the fact that religious
groups benefit incidentally does not deprive the subsidy of the secular
purpose and primary effect mandated by the Establishment Clause.
However, when government directs a subsidy exclusively to religious
organizations that is not required by the Free Exercise Clause . . ., it
provide[s] unjustifiable awards of assistance to religious organizations
and cannot but ‘convey a message of endorsement’ to slighted
members of the community.250

Thus, the Texas Monthly Court determined this award to religious
organizations was bald favoritism of religion.251 Walz and Texas Monthly
collectively seem to indicate that states may give tax exemptions to religious
organizations only if nonreligious charitable organizations are also beneficiaries,
but bald favoritism, such as a tax exemption solely for religious groups, violates
the Establishment Clause.252 The Missouri policy in Trinity Lutheran did not
exhibit bald favoritism towards religion, as its constitutional provision
prohibited direct financial assistance to religious organizations, and the policy
was initially intended to benefit nonreligious organizations and groups.253
Bald discrimination against religion in relation to state funding is also
prohibited by the First Amendment, as exemplified in Rosenberger v. Rector &

244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253

Id. at 14–15, 25.
Id. at 5
Id. at 15–16; Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 697 (1970).
Walz, 397 U.S. at 668; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 1298 (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 664).
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 1298–99 (citing Tex. Monthly, 489 U.S. at 11).
Tex. Monthly, 489 U.S. at 11.
Id. at 14–15.
Id. at 15.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 1299.
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2017 (2017).
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Visitors of the University of Virginia.254 In Rosenberger, a student Christian
publication at the University of Virginia was denied funding solely because the
publication “primarily promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a
deity or an ultimate reality,” as prohibited by the University’s policy.255 The
student publication claimed that this refusal violated its First Amendment free
speech rights.256 Rosenberger highlights the tension between the First
Amendment’s prohibition against establishment of religion and its protection of
free speech rights.257 The Court held that the state could not discriminate in a
public forum based on viewpoint, as the university denied funding solely
because the publication presented a Christian viewpoint, which was a violation
of the First Amendment.258 Trinity Lutheran is not analogous to Rosenberger,
because Trinity Lutheran is based solely on a free exercise claim,259 whereas
Rosenberger was not based on a free exercise claim. Rosenberger was grounded
in Free Speech Clause concerns and is about viewpoint discrimination.260
Furthermore, Rosenberger did not involve discretionary benefits or a house of
worship as in Trinity Lutheran; instead, Rosenberger involved the denial of
separate constitutional rights to a religious group.261
In Trinity Lutheran, the denial of a grant for a rubberized playground surface
did not result in favoritism, and despite the Church’s arguments to the contrary,
it did not result in discrimination against religion. The Missouri program did not
distinguish among religions or condition the receipt of a grant on a specific
religious belief. Instead, the program excluded all religious organizations from
eligibility.262 In refusing to provide a grant to the Church, Missouri was merely
following its long-standing state constitutional provision, which was intended to
protect against state antiestablishment concerns.
C. Trinity Lutheran Compared to Locke v. Davey and Walz v. Tax
Commission
Most situations related to religion and state taxation do not fall squarely into
the categories of blatant discrimination or clear favoritism. State programs that
do not promote blatant inequality and viewpoint discrimination of religion or
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262

Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822, 842–46 (1995).
Id. at 822–23.
Id. at 827.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 1250.
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845.
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2017 (2017).
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 823.
See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 159.
Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2017.
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clear favoritism of religion fall within the “play in the joints,” such as in Walz v.
Tax Commission of New York263 and Locke v. Davey.264 As the Court determined
in Walz, a New York property tax exemption for religious, educational, or
charitable purposes was constitutionally permissible, because the “[t]he
legislative purpose of a property tax exemption is neither the advancement nor
the inhibition of religion; it is neither sponsorship nor hostility.”265 Rather, the
goal of the state tax exemption was to help non-profit institutions and entities
that the State valued as important to the community.266 The Walz Court
recognized the tension between the First Amendment religion clauses and the
difficulty in finding “a neutral course between the two religion clauses, both of
which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical
extreme, would tend to clash with the other.”267 Ultimately, the Walz Court
determined the issue fell within the “play in the joints” and was deferential to
the State’s interest in furthering these institutions.268 The Walz Court rightfully
determined that states should have the freedom to regulate what they decides to
tax or exempt from taxation.269 The Trinity Lutheran Court should have followed
Walz, and deferred to the state’s line drawing in refusing to provide the grant to
the church. As Justice Sotomayor aptly pointed out in her Trinity Lutheran
dissent, “[the] opinion does not acknowledge that our precedents have expressly
approved of a government’s choice to draw lines based on an entity’s religious
status.”270
Further, as the Court determined in Locke, the State’s denial of a scholarship
for a theology degree is constitutionally permissible, and the decision of what to
do with state funds is up to the State’s discretion.271 The Trinity Lutheran Court
attempted to distinguish Locke by pointing out that:
Davey was not denied a scholarship because of who he was; he was
denied a scholarship because of what he proposed to do—use the funds
to prepare for the ministry. Here there is no question that Trinity
Lutheran was denied a grant simply because of what it is—a church.272
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397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
540 U.S. 712, 718–19 (2004).
265
Walz, 397 U.S. at 672.
266
Id. at 672–73.
267
Id. at 668–69.
268
Id. at 669.
269
Id. at 672–73.
270
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2038 (2017) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
271
Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 724–25 (2004).
272
Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2023.
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This argument seems to be implying that the free exercise interests were greater
in Trinity Lutheran than Locke.
However, the Trinity Lutheran Court failed to acknowledge a critical point:
by providing a scholarship for an individual to attend a university and pursue
any major of their choosing such as in Locke, even if the individual chose to
pursue a theology or religious major, the state funding is indirect rather than
direct aid. If an individual receives a state grant, even if they choose to use it to
pursue a religious major, the path from the state government to financial support
of religion is insulated by the individual’s choice between spending the funds on
religious or nonreligious uses. In the past, the Court has emphasized that the
individual’s choice of whether to support religion is different than the state’s
direct funding of religion.273 In fact, the Court has said that indirect aid or
government funding to a private individual who independently determines
whether to use it for religious or nonreligious activity is less likely to raise
Establishment Clause concerns than direct aid:
Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest thus make clear that where a government
aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and provides assistance
directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid
to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and
independent private choice, the program is not readily subject to
challenge under the Establishment Clause. A program that shares these
features permits government aid to reach religious institutions only by
way of the deliberate choices of numerous individual recipients. The
incidental advancement of a religious mission, or the perceived
endorsement of a religious message, is reasonably attributable to the
individual recipient, not to the government, whose role ends with the
disbursement of benefits.274

In contrast, if the state provides funding directly to the religious
organization, it is more likely to raise Establishment Clause concerns.275 In a
direct aid case, the state actions are not softened by an individual decision
regarding the use of the funds, such as in indirect aid cases. Trinity Lutheran is
a direct aid case because the funds from Missouri were to be given directly to
the Church, without the mitigating factor of an individual’s decision on how to

273
Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986) (“Aid recipients’ choices are
made among a huge variety of possible careers, of which only a small handful are sectarian. In this case, the fact
that aid goes to individuals means that the decision to support religious education is made by the individual, not
by the State.”).
274
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002).
275
See Brief of Religious & Civil Rights Organizations, supra note 140, at 18 (citing Witters, 474 U.S. at
487).
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use the funds.276 The Court has established limitations in direct aid cases to
sectarian organizations, specifically that if the state provides financial aid to a
sectarian organization, it must be used for a secular purpose.277 Thus, despite the
Court’s decision to the contrary, it appears that the state Establishment Clause
concerns were, in fact, greater in Trinity Lutheran than in Locke because Trinity
Lutheran is a direct aid case, whereas Locke was an indirect aid case.
D. Trinity Lutheran as a “Heckler’s Veto”
Another federalism concern that the Trinity Lutheran decision raises is the
idea of the “heckler’s veto.” A “heckler’s veto” occurs when the actions of a
hostile group interfere with the exercise of constitutional rights.278 A heckler’s
veto can also be explained as follows:
Heckler’s veto cases typically consider the appropriate behavior of
local law enforcement when a crowd or individual threatens hostile
action in response to a demonstration or speaker. In these cases, the
First Amendment grants a positive right to the speaker: the local
government must take action to protect the speaker against a hostile
crowd. The courts do not allow local law enforcement to accede to a
heckler’s veto.279

As such, common examples of a heckler’s veto would be if labor organizers,
religious groups, or members of an organization were forbidden to conduct a
parade, religious meeting, or public speech solely because citizens threatened to
disrupt or riot.280 In situations such as these, the heckler’s veto can inhibit
individuals’ and groups’ legitimate First Amendment rights. While heckler’s
vetoes seem to occur most frequently in First Amendment free speech

276

Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2017.
See Edward Correia, Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer: An Unfortunate New Anti-Discrimination
Principle, 18 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 280, 289 (2017).
278
See Ruth McGaffey, The Heckler’s Veto: A Reexamination, 57 MARQ. L. REV. 39, 40 (1973).
279
Richard F. Duncan, Just Another Brick in the Wall: The Establishment Clause as a Heckler’s Veto, 18
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 255, 264 (2014) (quoting Cheryl A. Leanza, Heckler’s Veto Case Law as a Resource for
Democratic Discourse, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1306 (2007)).
280
See McGaffey, supra note 278, at 39.
277
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contexts,281 they can also occur in contexts involving religious liberty, such as
in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,282 and Trinity Lutheran.283
In Pleasant Grove, the Court noted local taxpayers may not use the
Establishment Clause to second-guess a local government’s decision about how
it desires to use its public park land.284 In that case, a religious group called
Summum wanted to construct a monument that displayed its Seven Principles
of Faith in the same government-owned park as a Ten Commandments
monument.285 When the City rejected their monument, Summum alleged that
the City violated the Free Speech Clause by forbidding the display of their
Principles and claimed the City also violated the Establishment Clause by
displaying the Ten Commandments286 without representing other religions.287
The Court held that the Ten Commandments monument was a form of
permissible “government speech,” and that the city was not required to allow the
construction of the Summum monument.288 The Pleasant Grove Court
emphasized that neither the Establishment Clause nor the Free Speech Clause
gives private citizens a “heckler’s veto” over the City’s decision:
If every citizen were to have a right to insist that no one paid by public
funds express a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of
great concern to the public would be limited to those in the private
sector, and the process of government as we know it radically
transformed.289

The Court stressed that government officials were “accountable to the
electorate” for their speech and actions, and if the citizens disagree with officials,
they can use the political processes to vote them out.290 Thus, rather than using

281
Heckler’s Veto, DUHAIME’S LAW DICTIONARY, http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/H/
HecklersVeto.aspx (last visited Mar. 26, 2019); see McGaffey, supra note 278; Zach Greenberg, Rejecting the
‘Heckler’s Veto’, FIRE (June 14, 2017), https://www.thefire.org/rejecting-the-hecklers-veto/; David L. Hudson
Jr., Controversial Speakers and the Problem of the Heckles’ Veto, FREEDOM F. INST. (Apr. 26, 2017),
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2017/04/26/controversial-speakers-and-the-problem-of-the-hecklersveto/; Patrick Schmidt, Heckler’s Veto, FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/
article/968/heckler-s-veto (last visited Mar. 26, 2019).
282
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009).
283
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 (2017).
284
Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 467–69.
285
Id. at 465.
286
WITTE, JR. & NICHOLS, supra note 27, at 223.
287
Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 466, 482 (Scalia, J., concurring).
288
Id. at 472, 481 (majority opinion).
289
Id. at 468 (quoting Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1990)); WITTE, JR. & NICHOLS, supra
note 27, at 223.
290
Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 468–69.
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the Establishment Clause as a “heckler’s veto,” of the government’s decision,
citizens should voice their concerns at the ballot box.291
Like Pleasant Grove, the Trinity Lutheran decision is effectively a selfserving heckler’s veto. In other words, the Trinity Lutheran Court allowed the
Church to use the Free Exercise Clause as a “heckler’s veto” about how to spend
the state’s money in accordance with its state constitutional Blaine Amendment
restrictions. As the Pleasant Grove Court highlighted, neither the Establishment
Clause nor the Free Exercise Clause should provide citizens or organizations
such as Trinity Lutheran Church with a “heckler’s veto” over state legislative
decision-making.292 While all points of view and religions should be accepted in
society, individuals and organizations should not have the ability to compel the
state to override their state constitution and provide funding simply because the
“heckler” unfoundedly feels as if it violates their free exercise rights. If the
circumstances, such as in Trinity Lutheran, do not baldly discriminate against
religious organizations or exhibit favoritism of religion, the Court should hold
that the state or local officials are free to act either way—they may provide or
refuse to provide a grant to religious organizations without violating the First
Amendment religion clauses. If the citizens disagree with the local government’s
decision, they can voice their concerns at the ballot box and use the political
process to vote for individuals who reflect their views.
E. Other Federalism Concerns
In addition to the concept of the “heckler’s veto,” tax, and historical
federalism concerns, there are other advantages and arguments in favor of
allowing states to enforce their constitutional provisions concerning religion.
For one, Trinity Lutheran, along with precedent such as Locke and Walz, all
concern state tax funds, rather than federal funds, which strengthens the
federalism argument for local autonomy.293 One can argue that we should not
necessarily trust states to uphold and defend our constitutional rights, but there
are significant checks and balances on the state government. Since Trinity
Lutheran concerns only state tax funds, the choice of how to use the funds should
not be subject to control by the federal government because there are already
meaningful checks and balances over the way the funds are used. For instance,
the local legislatures are elected by the individuals within the locality, so if they
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See id.
See id. at 468; WITTE, JR. & NICHOLS, supra note 27, at 223.
293
See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017); Locke v. Davey, 540
U.S. 712 (2004); Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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make decisions that improperly use funds or negatively affect the community,
they will not be reelected. Even more importantly, the decisions of the local
legislatures are also subject to state judicial review, which also keeps them in
check. The local legislatures are also kept in check by the Establishment Clause
itself.
Furthermore, the federal government can only make one-size-fits-all
decisions on behalf of the entire country. State and local governments may be
better able to conduct fact-finding and make other tailored policies that federal
courts interpreting the religion clauses cannot. State and local public officials
are capable of determining what is best for their respective communities and are
most aware of which local organizations should receive grants and tax
exemptions, and which should not. Circumstances differ between states, school
districts, hospitals, cities, and so on. State and local enforcement of religious
liberty allow tailoring to fit the conditions of the locality and greater flexibility
in addressing local concerns. In this way, federalism is essential because it also
allows states to act as laboratories to formulate the most effective solutions to
critical problems.294 For example, if a state needs more vigorous religious
freedom protections due to local conditions such as religious bigotry, the
legislatures can enact laws to strengthen the religious liberty of the constituents
therein. Furthermore, federalism allows individuals to choose to live in a state
that closely aligns with their ideals, and addresses problems in a way they find
desirable.295 Thus, if the federal government refuses to defer to state sovereignty
on important issues, it eliminates the variety of state solutions to local problems,
and it diminishes individual freedom in this regard.296 If the states comply with
the minimum standards set by the federal religion clauses, they should be able
to enforce their own provisions that provide more expansive protection of
individual rights and serve to further their own antiestablishment issues.
It is important to address that in the past, in precedent such as Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Commission, Widmar v. Vincent, Thomas v. Review
Board of Indian Employment Security Division, and Sherbert v. Verner, the
Supreme Court overrode state constitutional establishment concerns about
spending money on religion and found them not compelling enough under the
First Amendment free exercise and speech clauses.297 However, these cases all
294

Cooper, supra note 9.
Id.
296
Id.
297
See generally Hobbie v. Unemp’t Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (finding that state
denial of receipt of a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief must be subjected to strict scrutiny
and can be justified only by proof of a compelling state interest); ’Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)
295
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took place during an era in which the Court held that the strict scrutiny should
be used in evaluating laws burdening the free exercise of religion.298 In 1990, in
Employment Division v. Smith, the Court changed the standard in free exercise
causes from strict scrutiny to a standard of neutrality, holding that the Free
Exercise Clause could not be used to challenge a neutral law of general
applicability.299 The Smith Court specifically noted that those seeking religious
exemptions from laws should look to political processes rather than the courts.300
During the Smith neutrality era, the Locke Court held that states have the
discretion on how they want to spend tax money and the extent to which they
wish to support religion financially.301 Therefore, these pre-1990 cases, where
the Court overrode state constitutional establishment concerns, are eclipsed by
precedent such as Locke v. Davey in the post-Smith era.302
Determining whether a government program or rule violates the
Establishment Clause can be challenging for states, so many prefer to create
bright-line rules and take a stricter approach to antiestablishment than the
Establishment Clause itself.303 However, after Trinity Lutheran, states have less
“play in the joints,” or less freedom to adopt their own antiestablishment policies
that are more robust than the Constitution.304 The decision creates a dilemma for
states in that it suggests that if a state provides too much assistance to a religious
organization, it violates the Establishment Clause, but if the benefit is allowed
by the Establishment Clause, it is also required by the Free Exercise Clause to
be offered to religious organizations. This predicament takes away the ability of
states to navigate the “play in the joints” and follow a more cautious approach
to the Establishment Clause line than the federal Establishment Clause itself.
This proverbial tightrope that states are forced to walk in the shrunken space
between the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause creates many
(holding that the state’’s interest in achieving greater separation of church and state than is already ensured under
the Establishment Clause is not sufficiently “compelling” to justify content-based discrimination against
religious speech of the student group in question); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707
(1981) (reasoning that justifications provided for Indiana’s inroading on religious liberty were not sufficiently
compelling); ’’Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (finding that there is no compelling state interest
enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute that justifies the substantial infringement of
appellant’s right to religious freedom under the First Amendment).
298
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 1316; WITTE, JR. & NICHOLS,
supra note 27, at 128.
299
494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 1317.
300
Smith, 494 U.S. at 890; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 1327.
301
Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721 (2004); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21.
302
Locke, 540 U.S. at 712.
303
Correia, supra note 277.
304
Russo & Thro, supra note 184, at 257.
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problems. It is likely that states will be less likely to provide public benefits,
considering that they will have to consider religious organization applicants as
well as nonreligious organization applicants.305 Thus, they will have to dedicate
time and resources to ensure the funds are not used for sectarian uses, and that
the program is not violating the Establishment Clause.306 The obligation of
monitoring state programs and the use of the government funds awarded to
religious organizations would be a significant administrative and financial
burden on the states.307 Furthermore, if the state provides a grant to a religious
organization and monitors what the funds are used for too infrequently, the funds
could be used for impermissible purposes. In contrast, if the state monitors too
frequently, they risk interfering with the internal affairs of a church.308 States
will also have the plight of reviewing applications from various competing
religious sects and also determine which denominations even qualify as a
“religion” in the first place.309 This situation is problematic as it raises both
Establishment Clause concerns that the state could favor or provide grants to one
religion over others, but also Free Exercise Clause concerns because the state
could disfavor particular religions in its provision of grants. Even secular criteria
for grants, such as the number of students served or size of the property, could
lead to favoritism of larger religious groups at the expense of smaller religious
groups. Because of the problems that this decision may bring, it is clear Locke
v. Davey is the better approach, and state tax and funding issues are best left subconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
This Comment argues that federal courts should follow Locke v. Davey’s
example rather than Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, and leave control of
state funding of religion to the political processes and not the courts. While the
full extent of Trinity Lutheran’s consequences for federalism and state
sovereignty remains to be seen, it is clear that the decision undercuts the longstanding federalism at work in Locke v. Davey and restricts states’ freedom to
adopt their own individual antiestablishment policies that are more robust than
the Constitution itself.
The issue of state funding and taxation of religion presented in Trinity
Lutheran falls within the “play in the joints,” meaning that providing a state305
306
307
308
309

See Correia, supra note 277, at 295.
Id.
See Brief of Religious & Civil Rights Organizations, supra note 140, at 19–20.
Id. at 21.
Correia, supra note 277, at 295–96.
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funded grant for a religious organization’s playground would not violate the
Establishment Clause, but the denial of a grant to a religious organization would
not violate the Free Exercise Clause either. The decision of how to use state
taxpayer money should be left to states’ discretion unless there is bald favoritism
of religion or bald discrimination against religion. The State of Missouri’s
refusal to provide a grant to a church for a rubberized playground surface based
on its state constitutional policy of denying grants to religiously affiliated
organizations was neither bald discrimination against religion nor favoritism. It
was simply upholding a long-standing state policy to enforce the State’s
antiestablishment interests. Accordingly, the Trinity Lutheran Court should have
followed the decision in Locke v. Davey, leaving state tax issues subconstitutional.
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